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Can the International Criminal Court 
Succeed? An Analysis of the Empirical 
Evidence of Violence Prevention 
BY STUART FORD* 
Abstract: Despite significant optimism about the future of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (“ICC”) during its early years, recently there 
has been growing criticism of it by both scholars and governments. As a 
result, there appears to be more doubt about the ICC’s ability to succeed 
now than at any other point in its history. So, are the critics correct? Is 
the ICC failing? No. This Article argues that, not only can the ICC suc-
ceed, there is strong evidence that it is already succeeding. It analyzes 
several recent empirical articles that have convincingly demonstrated 
that the ICC prevents serious violations of international criminal law. 
Prevention of violations is the principal goal of the ICC. Therefore, by 
preventing violence, the ICC is already accomplishing its most im-
portant goal. In other words, it is already succeeding. This may not be 
the dominant narrative about the Court, but it should be.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of this Article is a question: Can the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) succeed? This is an important question and one 
that scholars have grappled with since the Court’s creation. Despite 
some early detractors,1 there was significant optimism about the ICC 
 
* Professor of Law at UIC John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois.  This Article was im-
proved by the comments of Professor Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Professor Yvonne McDermott 
Rees, and the participants in the American Society of International Law’s International Courts 
and Tribunals Interest Group 2020 Works in Progress Conference. 
 1. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 89 (2003) (arguing that the ICC will never be successful because it is unacceptable to the 
United States). 
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during its early years.2 Recently, however, there has been growing dis-
content with it.3 There are several different strands to this discontent. 
First, a number of African nations have accused the ICC of anti-
African bias.4 This led The Gambia, South Africa, and Burundi to 
threaten to withdraw from the ICC.5 While The Gambia and South Afri-
ca eventually reversed course, Burundi did withdraw from the ICC in 
2017.6 It has also led the African Union to begin the process of setting 
up its own international criminal tribunal, partly to insulate African 
states from ICC jurisdiction.7 Second, several high-profile investigations 
and prosecutions have collapsed.8 Events like the acquittal of President 
Laurent Gbagbo,9 the collapse of the prosecution of President Kenyat-
ta,10 and the suspension of the ICC’s investigation into the situation in 
 
 2. David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 473, 473 (1999) (“Enthusiasm for international criminal prosecutions is 
running high”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The 
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997) 
(arguing in favor of the establishment of the ICC); Darryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the 
International Criminal Court Cannot Win, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 323, 324 (2015) (“The tenor of 
scholarly discourse surrounding the ICC has gone through phases.  At an early point, many schol-
ars in international criminal law (“ICL”) were arguably overly protective of the Court, possibly 
because they were hesitant to criticize a fledgling institution with powerful detractors.”). 
 3. See Robert Cryer et al., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE (Cambridge University Press 4th ed.) 169 (“Assessments of the [ICC’s] record to 
date are mixed and increasingly negative.”); see also id. at 169-171 (describing criticisms of the 
court). 
 4. Geoff Dancy & Florencia Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why Interna-
tional Criminal Court Investigations May Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions, 111 
AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 689 (2017) (describing how several African nations have become disillu-
sioned with the ICC and have begun the process for withdrawing from it); Jean-Baptiste Jeangène 
Vilmer, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis, 92 
INT’L AFFAIRS 1319, 1319-20 (2016). 
 5. See Vilmer, supra note 4, at 1322-28 (describing threats by several African nations to 
withdraw from the ICC). 
 6. See Dancy and Montal, supra note 4, at 689. 
 7. Stuart Ford, Between Hope and Doubt: The Malabo Protocol and the Resource Re-
quirements of an African Criminal Court, in THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES 1076, 1082-84 (Charles C. 
Jalloh et al. eds., 2019). 
 8. See Nancy L Combs, International Criminal Court comes of age, HILL, (Jan. 30, 2019), 
available at https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/426954-international-criminal-court-
comes-of-age (describing recent setbacks for the ICC’s prosecutor); ICC Appeals Chamber ac-
quits Mr. Bemba from charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, June 8, 2018, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1390 (noting that the ICC Appeals Chamber 
had reversed the conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo). 
 9. See Combs, supra note 8 (describing the acquittal of Laurent Gbagbo, the former Presi-
dent of Côte d’Ivoire). 
 10. See Vilmer, supra note 4, at 1323. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/20  7:14 PM 
2020]      ICC Preventing International Criminal Law Violation 103 
Darfur11 have all been viewed as significant blows to the Court.12 Third 
and finally, scholars and academics have become increasingly critical of 
the Court and its work.13 For example, the ICC has recently been criti-
cized for its failure to rein in the most powerful states,14 its failure to 
prosecute senior leaders,15 its failure to investigate various situations,16 
its failure to adequately prosecute crimes of sexual violence,17 and its 
general lack of legitimacy.18 
As a result of these challenges, today there appears to be more 
doubt about the ICC’s future than at any other point in its history.19 
While this increasing negativity about the Court is partly a result of 
events that are specific to the ICC (like the collapse of the Kenyatta trial 
and the Darfur investigations), it is also part of a broader pattern of 
skepticism about the utility of international law and international organ-
izations in general.20 So, are the critics correct? Should we be skeptical 
 
 11. See Stuart Ford, The ICC and the Security Council: How Much Support Is There For 
Ending Impunity?, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33, 34 (2016). 
 12. See id.; Vilmer, supra note 4, at 1323; Combs, supra note 8. 
 13. Robinson, supra note 3, at 324 (“More recently, the critical note has come to dominate 
the discourse.  Today, journal articles, blog postings, and conference presentations feature a varie-
ty of increasingly strident criticisms of the Court.”); see also id., at 327-328 (providing examples 
of how the ICC has been criticized no matter how it obtains jurisdiction over situations). 
 14. See Thomas Cristiano, The arbitrary circumscription of the jurisdiction of the interna-
tional criminal court, 23 CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 352 (2020) (arguing that the ICC’s inability to hold accountable powerful states un-
dermines the legitimacy of the court). 
 15. See Kirsten Ainsley, Retreat or retrenchment? An analysis of the International Criminal 
Court’s failure to prosecute presidents, in Alison Brysk & Michael Stohl eds., CONTRACTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS: CRISIS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OPPORTUNITY (Edward Elgar 2018); Gerhard 
Kemp, Immunity of High-Ranking Officials Before the International Criminal Court – Between 
International Law and Political Reality, in Gerhard Werle & Andreas Zimmerman eds., THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN TURBULENT TIMES (Spring 2019). 
 16. See, e.g., John Dugard, Palestine and the International Criminal Court: Institutional 
Failure or Bias?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 563 (2013). 
 17. See Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Sixty Years of Failing to Prosecute Sexual Crimes: From 
Raphael Lemkin at Nuremberg to Lubanga at the International Criminal Court, in Mary Michelle 
Connellan and Christine Frohlich eds., A GENDERED LENS FOR GENOCIDE PREVENTION (Pal-
grave MacMillan 2018). 
 18. See Allen Buchanan, The Complex Epistemology of Institutional Legitimacy Assess-
ments, as Illustrated by the Case of the International Criminal Court, 33 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 323 (2019). 
 19. See Vilmer, supra note 4, at 1320 (describing the ICC as facing “the most serious dip-
lomatic crisis in the court’s history” and expressing concern that the tension between African 
states and the ICC will weaken both the ICC and “the entire international criminal justice sys-
tem”); Combs, supra note 8 (declaring that “[t]he international criminal court is in crisis.”); Cryer 
et al., supra note 3, at 169 (noting that evaluations of the court have become “increasingly nega-
tive” in recent years). 
 20. See, e.g., Rebecca Friedman Lissner & Mira Rapp-Hooper, The Day After Trump: Amer-
ican Strategy for a New International Order, 41 WASH. Q. 7 (2018). 
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of the ICC and its prospects for success? Is the ICC failing? No. This 
Article argues that the ICC is already succeeding. There is now exten-
sive empirical evidence that the ICC reduces violence.21 Since violence 
prevention is the most important goal of the Court,22 this means that it is 
already succeeding. This is not the dominant narrative about the Court, 
but it should be. 
II.  DEFINING SUCCESS 
This Article is primarily about whether the ICC is successful. But, 
we need to begin by defining success. After all, it is impossible to know 
if the ICC is succeeding if we do not know what success looks like. The 
dictionary definition of success is to accomplish an aim,23 which sug-
gests that success is measured against some aim or aims. Accomplish 
those and you have succeeded. But is this what success means for the 
ICC? The short answer is yes. 
As Professor Shany has persuasively argued, the success of inter-
national courts should be measured by whether they accomplish their 
goals.24 Those goals almost always involve achieving some concrete 
change in the world. Thus, knowing whether a court is successful re-
quires distinguishing between its outputs (the direct products of the or-
ganization’s operations) and its outcomes (the effect of the organization 
on the external state of the world).25 A court can produce its intended 
output and still be a failure if it does not achieve any of its intended ef-
fects on the world. It is a court’s ability to achieve positive outcomes in 
the real world that determines its success.  
This understanding of success has important implications for the 
ICC. The principal output of international criminal courts is the trial of 
those accused of violating international criminal law (“ICL”).26 But 
simply holding trials is not what makes the ICC successful.27 Thus, at-
 
 21. See infra Part IV (describing the empirical evidence that the ICC does prevent violence). 
 22. See infra Part III (describing the goals of the Court). 
 23. THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 1007 (1999) (defining 
success as “the accomplishment of an aim; a favorable outcome”).  Other dictionary definitions 
are similar; see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th 
ed. 2000) 1728 (“The achievement of something desired, planned, or attempted”); RANDOM 
HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1334 (1992) (“the favorable or prosperous termina-
tion of attempts or endeavors”). 
 24. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based 
Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 230 (2012). 
 25. Id. at 248. 
 26. Stuart Ford, A Hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts, 27 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 179, 182 (2018). 
 27. Id. at 186.   
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tempts to define the success of international criminal courts by the 
number of people indicted, arrested, or tried, are misguided.28 Rather, it 
is the accomplishment of its goals that defines the success of the ICC.  
If the ICC is accomplishing its goals, then it is fundamentally a 
success, even if it has problems or there is still room for improvement. 
The ICC has certainly had its share of problems in recent years.29 For 
example, the acquittal of President Laurent Gbagbo, the collapse of the 
case against President Kenyatta of Kenya, and the Prosecutor’s suspen-
sion of the investigation into the situation in Darfur were widely and 
correctly viewed as setbacks for the Court.30 The Court must respond to 
concerns about anti-African bias,31 and there are numerous legitimate 
scholarly criticisms of the court.32 Nevertheless, the success of the ICC 
is not determined by the outcome of particular trials or investigations, 
by the number of its member states, or by the opinions of scholars. Ra-
ther, the Court’s success is measured by its ability to achieve its goals.33 
Of course, as Professor Shany has noted, measuring whether inter-
national courts are accomplishing their goals is difficult.34 But before we 
get to the question of how to measure whether the ICC is accomplishing 
its goals, the first problem is to define those goals. After all, if we are to 
measure the ICC’s success by its ability to achieve its goals, we must be 
able to articulate those goals. This is, itself, a complex problem.35  
III.  THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S GOALS 
As the discussion above suggests, the ICC’s success is inextricably 
linked to the accomplishment of its goals. Of course, much has been 
written about the goals of international criminal courts.36 A close review 
of that literature demonstrates that there are at least nine separate goals 
 
 28. See, e.g., Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International Criminal 
Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and ICTR, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 349, 359-362 (2005) (basing 
an evaluation of effectiveness on the number of individuals indicted, arrested, and tried). 
 29. See supra Part I (describing various reasons why the ICC has come under increasing 
criticism by states and scholars). 
 30. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12. 
 31. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6. 
 32. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18. 
 33. See generally Sigall Horovitz et al., The International Criminal Court, in ASSESSING 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 223, 223-252 (Yuval Shany ed., 2014). 
 34. Shany, supra note 24, at 239 (noting that the “goals of public organizations, such as 
courts, tend to be ambiguous, and the public goods they generate, such as justice, peace, and legal 
certainty, are hard to quantify”). 
 35. Id. at 233 (discussing the problem of goal ambiguity); id. at 242-248 (discussing how to 
identify the various goals of international courts). 
 36. See A Hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts, supra note 26, at 188-92 
(discussing the extensive literature on the goals of international criminal courts). 
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that have been ascribed to international criminal courts.37 Those goals 
are: 1) assigning responsibility for wrongs and punishing the guilty; 2) 
providing closure or redress for victims; 3) establishing a reliable histor-
ical record; 4) fostering post-conflict reconciliation; 5) expressing con-
demnation of abhorrent acts; 6) ending impunity; 7) preventing viola-
tions of international criminal law; 8) maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security; and 9) developing international crimi-
nal law.38 But, until recently, there had been no attempt to systematical-
ly evaluate the relative importance of these goals.39 So how do we de-
cide which goals matter most for the ICC’s success?  
In a recent article, entitled A Hierarchy of the Goals of Interna-
tional Criminal Courts, the author proposed a method for evaluating 
those goals and establishing a hierarchy amongst them. The article ar-
gued that the court should focus on those goals that have the highest ex-
pected value.40 The expected value of a goal is calculated as the benefit 
that would accrue if that goal were accomplished multiplied by the like-
lihood of it being accomplished.41 Using that methodology, it evaluated 
the goals most commonly ascribed to international criminal tribunals, 
including the ICC.42  
That analysis showed that the goal with the highest expected value 
is that of preventing violations of international criminal law.43 This is 
because of the enormous costs associated with serious violations of 
ICL.44 Those costs are high because of the widespread and destructive 
nature of the violations.45 Serious violations of international criminal 
law (the kind that warrant the intervention of the International Criminal 
Court46) tend to take place during armed conflicts and are carried out by 
 
 37. Id. at 189-90. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 191-92. 
 40. Id. at 192 (“[T]he goal that yields the greatest expected value is the most important goal 
and the one that international tribunals should strive to achieve.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 195-242. 
 43. Id. at 238-41. 
 44. Id. at 226-28. 
 45. Id. 
 46. The ICC only becomes involved when the violations are very serious. The ICC only has 
jurisdiction over aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. See Rome Stat-
ute, Arts. 6-8 bis. The Rome Statute describes these as “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community. Id. Art. 1. Moreover, for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over a case, the 
underlying crimes must be “of sufficient gravity to justify” ICC involvement. Id. Art. 17(1)(d). 
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hierarchically organized armed groups.47 The victims are usually civil-
ians, often women and children.48 Moreover, the number of victims is 
large, with the typical ICC investigation involving thousands of rapes 
and murders, hundreds of thousands to millions of people forcibly dis-
placed, and widespread destruction of property and infrastructure.49 
These violations have enormous costs for both individuals and so-
cieties. The costs for individual victims can include shock, loss of trust, 
guilt, temporary or permanent incapacity, financial loss, psychological 
effects, and significant social repercussions.50 This is especially true of 
victims of physical and sexual violence, who tend to experience strong-
er effects that persist for longer periods.51 Even those who are ‘only’ 
subjected to forcible displacement suffer significant harm.52 Family 
members, friends, and colleagues of the victim also experience many of 
these effects.53  
Serious violations of ICL also have enormous costs for the socie-
ties where they occur. These include costs associated with medical care, 
property loss, and loss of productivity.54 Unsurprisingly, the sort of vio-
lence associated with violations of ICL—murder, rape and widespread 
property destruction—generates the largest societal costs.55 Research on 
the costs of mass atrocities suggests that the costs of serious violations 
of ICL run from tens to hundreds of billions of dollars per conflict.56 
 
 47. See Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources Does the International Criminal Court 
Need to Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 31-32 
(2017). 
 48. Id. at 33. 
 49. Id. at 35; see also id. at 37 tbl.1. 
 50. See Joanna Shapland & Matthew Hall, What Do We Know About the Effect of Crime on 
Victims?, 14 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 175, 178 (2007). 
 51. Id. at 196–97. 
 52. See, e.g., James M. Shultz et al., Internally Displaced “Victims of Armed Conflict” in 
Colombia: The Trajectory and Trauma Signature of Forced Migration, 16 CURRENT 
PSYCHIATRY REP. 1, 2 (2014) (“IDPs [internally displaced persons] experience extraordinary ad-
versities, overt danger, and psychological distress throughout all phases along the trajectory of 
displacement, leading to chronic elevation of risks for victimization, physical ailments, and men-
tal disorders.”). 
 53. See Shapland & Hall, supra note 50, at 179. 
 54. See Nyantara Wickramasekera et al., Cost of Crime: A Systematic Review, 43 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 218, 218-20 (2015). 
 55. Id. at 221-23 tbl. 2 & 3. 
 56. For example, one study concluded that the average cost of a civil war was somewhere 
between $60 and $250 billion. See Paul Collier et al., The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone 
Countries, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 58, 63-65 (Bjørn Lomborg ed., 2d ed. 2009); 
see also Hamid E. Ali, Estimate of the Economic Cost of Armed Conflict: A Case Study from 
Darfur, 24 DEF. & PEACE ECON. 503 (2012) (estimating the cost of the conflict in Darfur to be in 
the tens of billions of dollars); Humberto Lopez & Quentin Wodon, The Economic Impact of 
Armed Conflict in Rwanda, 14 J. AFR. ECONOMIES 586 (2005) (finding that the conflict in Rwan-
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As a result of the enormous individual and societal costs associated 
with serious violations of ICL, preventing those violations has enor-
mous benefits.57 The costs associated with serious violations of ICL 
make prevention the most important goal of the ICC.58 The ICC pursues 
other goals that have value too.59 These include retribution,60 establish-
ing a reliable historical record,61 and providing closure or redress for 
victims.62 But these other goals have significantly less expected value 
than violence prevention.63 Thus, while the ICC seeks to accomplish a 
number of different goals, preventing violations is the most important of 
those goals.64 As a result, the ICC’s success will be largely be deter-
mined by whether it can prevent violations of international criminal 
law.65 
IV.  PREVENTING VIOLATIONS 
A lot has been written about the ability of international criminal 
courts to prevent violations of international criminal law.66 Some schol-
 
da reduced gross domestic product by twenty-five to thirty percent); Pieter Serneels & Marjike 
Verpoorten, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Economic Performance: Evidence from Rwanda, 
59 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 555 (2015) (finding that the areas in Rwanda that had the worst violence 
also had the poorest subsequent economic performance); Sanjeev Gupta et al., Fiscal Conse-
quences of Armed Conflict and Terrorism in Low and Middle-Income Countries (IMF, Working 
Paper No. WP/02/142, 2002); Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, The Economic Costs of Con-
flict: A Case Study of the Basque Country, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 113 (2003); Anke Hoeffler & 
Marta Reynal-Querol, Measuring the Costs of Conflict 3 (Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at http://conflictrecovery.org/bin/2003_Hoeffler_Reynal-Measuring_the_Costs_of_
Conflict.pdf); Stergios Skaperdas, The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence, 
12 ECON. GOVERNANCE 1 (2011); Nicholas Staines, Economic Performance Over the Conflict 
Cycle (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/04/95, 2004). 
 57. A Hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts, supra note 26, at 226-28. 
 58. Id. at 238-41. 
 59. Id. at 235 tbl. 2 (describing the value of the various goals ascribed to international crimi-
nal courts). 
 60. Id. at 196-97. 
 61. Id. at 197-201. 
 62. Id. at 201-07. 
 63. Id. at 235 tbl. 2. 
 64. Id. at 238-42. 
 65. Id. (For example, a court that provided retribution, established a reliable historical rec-
ord, and provided closure for victims would probably not be considered a success if it failed to 
prevent violence.  Conversely, a court that prevented violence would probably be considered a 
success even if it did not accomplish the other goals). 
 66. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Pre-
vent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001); James F. Alexander, The International 
Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 
1 (2009); Wippman, supra note 2; see also Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Ex-
pressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 280 (2012) (not-
ing that prevention is often presented as a primary goal of international courts); But see Hyeran Jo 
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ars, like Professor Akhavan, have argued that international courts can 
prevent violations.67 Many others have expressed doubt about this.68 As 
a result, the question of whether courts can prevent violations has been 
described by Professor deGuzman as “highly contested.”69  
But, the evidence for or against prevention was largely theoretical 
or anecdotal. For example, Professor Akhavan’s approach was anecdo-
tal (looking at a number of case studies),70 while Professor Damaška’s 
approach was theoretical (arguing that deterrence will not work because 
perpetrators are not rational actors).71 Until fairly recently, there were no 
empirical studies of the Court’s ability to prevent violence.72 This lack 
 
& Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 
445–46 (2016) (listing scholars who have argued that the ICC cannot prevent violations). 
 67. See Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: 
Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 624, 625 (2009) 
(using case studies of indictments for leaders in Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Sudan, Professor 
Akhavan argues that the ICC deters violence by raising the potential cost of it); see also William 
W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National 
Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 53, 74 (2008) (“Some 
extant qualitative research studies suggest, for example, that certain ICC indictees were con-
cerned about the prospect of ICC prosecution years before their indictment or arrest,”) (“Paramili-
taries have reportedly cited the Court’s potential prosecution as part of their reasoning for relin-
quishing power”); Yvonne M. Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute: Evidence of 
(Non)Compliance from Kenya, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 7, 19-22 (2016) (arguing that the 
ICC’s indictments of senior Kenyan leaders following post-election violence in 2008 led those 
same leaders to use much less combative rhetoric during the next election and ultimately led to 
much more peaceful elections in 2013).   
 68. See Mirjan Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHICAGO-
KENT L. REV. 329, 344-45 (2008) (arguing that deterrence is unlikely to work for international 
crimes because the perpetrators are not rational actors and because there is a very low likelihood 
of punishment); Justin Levitt, Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law (Pt. 2): The 
Promises of International Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1965 (2001) (noting that both 
Serbian and Kosovar forces engaged in violations of international criminal law in Kosovo in 1999 
and that the ICTY was not able to prevent those violations despite having indicted numerous in-
dividuals for violations of international criminal law in the Balkans); deGuzman, supra note 66, 
at 307–08 (noting that many commentators are skeptical of the ability of international courts to 
deter criminal behavior for various reasons); Wippman, supra note 2, at 474 (“Unfortunately, the 
connection between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future atrocities is at 
best a plausible but largely untested assumption. Actual experience with efforts at deterrence is 
not encouraging.”);  see also Jo & Simmons, supra note 66, at 445-46 (listing scholars who have 
argued that the ICC cannot prevent violations). 
 69. See deGuzman, supra note 66, at 270. 
 70. See Akhavan, supra note 67 (reviewing case studies of the impact of international tribu-
nals). 
 71. See Damaška, supra note 68 (arguing that deterrence will not work because perpetrators 
are not rational actors). 
 72. See Sigall Horovitz et al., supra note 33, at 228 (“The claim that international criminal 
adjudication can generate deterrence is difficult to prove or measure empirically . . ..”); id. at 248 
(“The literature about the ICC includes very few empirical studies about the Court’s actual out-
comes.”); Benjamin Appel, In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court: Does the ICC 
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of empirical studies was unfortunate because much could be learned by 
taking a data-driven approach to the problem.73 As a result, it was hard 
to draw firm conclusions about the Court’s success.74 For example, Ho-
rovitz et al. were unable to predict whether the ICC could succeed, 
largely due to the lack of data.75 
In the last couple of years, however, a series of articles have begun 
to empirically test whether international courts can prevent violations of 
ICL. These include articles by Professor Hillebrecht,76 Professor Meer-
nik,77 Professors Jo and Simmons,78 Professor Dancy et al.,79 and Profes-
sor Appel.80 These empirical articles represent a significant advance in 
our understanding of the ICC’s effect on violations of international 
criminal law. Each article will be discussed in one of the subparts be-
low. Subpart F below synthesizes their findings. 
A.  Reducing Violence in Libya (Professor Hillebrecht) 
In a 2016 article, Professor Hillebrecht explored the effect of the 
ICC’s involvement in Libya on civilian deaths.81 The conflict in Libya 
began in February 2011 as people took to the streets to protest the rule 
of Muammar Qaddafi.82 The protests quickly morphed into a conflict 
 
Deter Human Rights Violations?, 62 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 4 (2016) (“[T]here is a lack of empir-
ical research examining whether the Court has fulfilled its mandate and prevented gross human 
rights abuses.”). 
 73. See Geoff Dancy & Florencia Montal, From Law versus Politics to Law in Politics: A 
Pragmatist Assessment of the ICC’s Impact, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 645, 660 (2017) (“One of 
the only ways to draw inferences about conflict prevention is to compare a wide range of data.  
Cross-national analysis can help us see what is not apparent in specific case studies.”);  see also 
id. at 672-73 (noting the shortcomings of focusing on the outcomes of specific instances of vio-
lence rather than systematically looking at patterns of violence at a global level). 
 74. See Appel, supra note 72, at 6 (noting that detractors and supporters of the ICC had both 
made “compelling claims about the ICC’s effectiveness” but that the debate could not be resolved 
because “they have failed to adequately test” those claims). 
 75. See Sigall Horovitz et al., supra note 33, at 252 (“The mixed indicators regarding pro-
spective goal attainment are not resolved by analysis of the Court’s performance. The data availa-
ble to date on this issue are partial in scope.”). 
 76. See Courtney Hillebrecht, The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: 
Evidence from Libya, 42 INT’L INTERACTIONS 616 (2016). 
 77. See James Meernik, The International Criminal Court and the Deterrence of Human 
Rights Atrocities, 17 CIVIL WARS 318 (2015). 
 78. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 66. 
 79. See Geoff Dancy and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, The impact of criminal prosecutions dur-
ing intrastate conflict, 55 J. PEACE RESEARCH 47 (2018); Dancy and Montal supra note 4; Geoff 
Dancy, Searching for Deterrence at the International Criminal Court, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
625 (2017). 
 80. See Appel, supra note 72. 
 81. See Hillebrecht, supra note 76. 
 82. Id. at 619. 
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between armed forces loyal to Qaddafi and rebel forces.83 The conflict 
was marked by attacks by government forces that left thousands of ci-
vilians dead.84 The international community quickly became involved 
and the Security Council referred the situation to the ICC for investiga-
tion.85 The ICC subsequently took a number of actions related to the 
Libyan conflict, including opening a formal investigation, assigning the 
matter to a chamber, requesting the issuance of arrest warrants, and is-
suing arrest warrants against Libyan government officials.86 
Professor Hillebrecht’s article explores the effect of those ICC ac-
tions on the level of violence in Libya. She hypothesized that if ICC in-
tervention prevents violence then one would expect to see the level of 
violence in Libya decrease in the aftermath of ICC action.87 She tested 
this hypothesis using a statistical model that analyzed whether the civil-
ian death toll decreased in the immediate aftermath of ICC action.88 Pro-
fessor Hillebrecht controlled for several variables that are known to af-
fect the civilian death rate; including the intensity of the conflict 
between the Libyan government and the rebels, the North Atlantic Trea-
ty Organization’s (“NATO”) military intervention, and the intensity of 
global news coverage.89 
She found that civilian death tolls did decrease in the aftermath of 
ICC intervention.90 “The results of this analysis suggest that the ICC’s 
involvement in Libya had a negative and statistically significant effect 
on the number of fatalities.”91 And, this effect was cumulative. The 
more action the ICC took, the lower the rate of civilian fatalities.92 Of 
course, ICC involvement did not stop the violence against civilians, but 
it did correlate with a statistically significant reduction in that vio-
lence.93 
 
 83. Id.; see also Stuart Ford, The Gravity of ICC Investigations Carried Out Between 2002 
and 2015, 14-15 (Feb. 6, 2015) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2101764). 
 84. See Hillebrecht, supra note 76, at 619-20. 
 85. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 86. See Hillebrecht, supra note 76, at 629. 
 87. Id. at 628 (“Action at the ICC will lead to a decrease in the violence committed during a 
conflict, particularly government-sponsored killing of civilians.”). 
 88. Id. at 628-32 (describing the model and the data). 
 89. Id. at 629-31 (describing the control variables). 
 90. Id. at 632. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (discussing the results of Model 5, which tested for the cumulative effect of ICC in-
tervention). 
 93. Id.; see also Hillebrecht, supra note 76, at 634-36 (showing the expected impact of vari-
ous ICC actions on daily civilian death tolls). 
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Professor Hillebrecht cautions that, in some ways, Libya represents 
an ideal situation for testing the ICC’s impact because it did not act 
alone in Libya.94 The ICC’s involvement took place in the context of a 
significant contemporaneous military intervention by NATO.95 Theoret-
ically, one would expect the ICC to be most effective when it is sup-
ported by other international actors.96 So, it is not clear if Professor Hil-
lebrecht’s findings can be generalized to situations when the ICC acts 
alone.97 Nevertheless, her work provides evidence that ICC intervention 
does prevent violence, at least in some circumstances. 
B.  The Effect of Ratifying the Rome Statute on Human Rights 
Compliance (Professor Meernik) 
In 2015, Professor Meernik looked at the effect of ratification of 
the Rome Statute on state behavior.98 He did this against the backdrop of 
a body of literature, which found that ratification of human rights trea-
ties generally does little to improve state compliance with human rights 
obligations.99 But, he argued that the ICC may be in a better position 
than other human rights treaties to encourage compliance because it has 
stronger enforcement mechanisms.100  
His model included data on all non-Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) states.101 The OECD states 
were excluded from the sample because “they are the most likely to be 
predisposed to abide by the rule of law and avoid human rights viola-
tions” and Professor Meernik was concerned their inclusion might bias 
the findings in favor of the ICC.102 He also controlled for several varia-
bles that might affect human rights compliance, including commitment 
to the rule of law, the strength of democracy, the potential for ethnic 
conflict, and per capita gross national product.103 
First, Professor Meernik found that states with a strong commit-
ment to the rule of law had higher levels of human rights protection, 
fewer instances of human rights abuse, and fewer episodes of internal 
 
 94. Id. at 637-38. 
 95. Id. at 622. 
 96. Id. at 625; see also Ford, supra note 47, at 63 (noting the importance of international 
support to the ICC). 
 97. See Hillebrecht, supra note 76, at 637-638. 
 98. See generally Meernik, supra note 77. 
 99. Id. at 320-21. 
 100. Id. at 322 (noting the independent authority of the ICC Prosecutor to open investigations 
as well as the authority of the Security Council to refer matters to the ICC). 
 101. Id. at 333.   
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 327-29. 
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violence.104 This is not particularly surprising.105 But, he also found that 
the ICC had an impact independent of the state’s underlying commit-
ment to the rule of law. States that demonstrated a commitment to the 
ICC, for example by enacting domestic legislation to implement the 
state’s obligations under the Rome Statute, also had higher levels of 
human rights protection, fewer human rights abuses, and fewer instanc-
es of internal violence.106 The effect sizes107 for ICC commitment were, 
on average, a quarter of those for the rule of law, which suggests that 
commitment to the rule of law is a stronger predictor of compliance 
with human rights obligations.108 Nevertheless, ICC support was also a 
statistically significant predictor of human rights compliance. 
Ultimately, states that exhibited a strong commitment to the ICC 
had less political violence than countries with a similar commitment to 
the rule of law but a weaker commitment to the ICC.109 Professor Meer-
nik also found that states with a strong commitment to the ICC were 
less likely to be the subject of ICC investigations.110 Ultimately, he con-
cluded that his findings indicate “that the ICC can exercise a deterrent 
impact.”111 
C.  The Effect of the ICC on Civilian Deaths (Professors Jo and 
Simmons) 
In a 2016 article, Professors Jo and Simmons investigated the ef-
fect of the ICC on violence against civilians across a wide range of 
 
 104. Id. at 330-33. 
 105. Id. at 326-27 (hypothesizing that states that have a strong domestic commitment to the 
rule of law will be less likely to have human rights abuses). 
 106. Id. at 333. 
 107. Effect size refers to the magnitude of the effect of an explanatory variable on the out-
come variable.  Effect size is important because a variable that is statistically significant but has a 
small effect size has only a small effect on the outcome variable even though that effect is detect-
able and unlikely to be the result of chance, whereas a variable that is statistically significant and 
has a large effect size has a much larger impact on the outcome variable. 
 108. Id. at 330-32 (The effect size of the variables can be found in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The 
ratios of the effect size of the rule of law to ICC support are .251 in Table 1, .311 in Table 2, and 
.202 in Table 3). 
 109. Id. at 333 (“States that demonstrate further commitment to the ICC by enacting domestic 
legislation that provides for national prosecution of international crimes; by ratifying the Agree-
ment on Privileges and Immunities for the ICC; and by refraining from concluding a bilateral 
immunity agreement with the United States are more likely to have better human rights records 
and be involved in less internal violence”).   
 110. Id. at 334-35. 
 111. Id. at 333. 
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countries and covering a period of more than twenty years.112 They 
looked for effects on civilian violence stemming from: 1) ratification of 
the Rome Statute; 2) the number of ICC actions (preliminary investiga-
tions, investigations, arrest warrants, etc.) in a given year; and 3) the 
presence of a domestic statute criminalizing war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide.113 They also controlled for a number of varia-
bles that are expected to affect the number of civilian deaths, including 
commitment to the rule of law, regime type, whether there was an ongo-
ing civil war, and states’ preferences for peace and justice.114 
Professors Jo and Simmons began by exploring the effects of the 
ICC on government forces. In some ways, the results are not surprising. 
They found that a commitment to the rule of law decreased civilian 
deaths while an ongoing civil war increased civilian deaths.115 But, more 
importantly, they found that each of the ICC variables independently 
decreased civilian deaths by a statistically significant amount.116 Thus, 
ratifying the Rome Statute, increasing ICC activity, and adopting a do-
mestic statute criminalizing international crimes are associated with a 
decrease in civilian killings.117 Strikingly, the ICC-related effect sizes 
exceeded the effect sizes for the rule of law variable, which suggests 
that the ICC had a larger effect on government-sponsored killings than 
that government’s underlying commitment to the rule of law.118 To put it 
another way, Professors Jo and Simmons estimate that ICC ratification 
reduces the rate of government-sponsored killings by nearly fifty-
percent.119 
They also looked at how the ICC affected civilian deaths caused 
by rebel groups. They found that the ICC does not affect rebel groups as 
much as governments.120 For one thing, ratification of the Rome Statute 
had no statistically significant effect on rebels.121 But, Professors Jo and 
 
 112. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 66, at 455-56 (Their sample included all countries since 
1945 that experience a civil war. This resulted in data on 101 countries, with countries coming 
from Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe. The data covered the period from 1989 to 2011). 
 113. Id. at 457-58 (describing the independent variables). 
 114. Id. at 458-59 (describing the control variables).   
 115. Id. at 461. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 460-63. 
 118. Id. at 461. For each of the first three models, the effect size of the ICC-related variable 
exceeds the effect size of the rule of law variable. 
 119. Id. at 460; see also id. at 466 (“Collectively, the evidence is highly suggestive that the 
ICC has influenced government tactics when it comes to civilian violence.”). 
 120. Id. at 470. 
 121. Id. at 467. The variable for ICC ratification is not statistically significant in either Model 
1 or 4. Statistical significance is a term used to indicate that an association between an explanato-
ry variable and the outcome variable is unlikely to be the result of chance.  Typically, if an asso-
FINAL_FOR_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/20  7:14 PM 
2020]      ICC Preventing International Criminal Law Violation 115 
Simmons found that ICC actions (like opening investigations, issuing 
warrants, and conducting trials) did reduce rebel-sponsored civilian kill-
ings and the results were statistically significant.122 They interpret this to 
mean that rebel groups do not respond to ratification of the Rome Stat-
ute but do take notice and change their behavior when the ICC becomes 
directly involved.123 However, even when the ICC reduces violence by 
rebel groups, the size of that effect is smaller than with governments. 
Whereas the influence of the ICC reduced government-sponsored kill-
ings by nearly fifty percent,124 it reduced rebel-sponsored killings by on-
ly about twenty percent.125 
Professors Jo and Simmons attribute the smaller effect of the ICC 
on rebel groups to the nature of those groups.126 Rebels are not directly 
responsible to any constituency, their crimes may be harder to investi-
gate, rebels are often hard to apprehend, and they may be less aware of 
and have a weaker commitment to international law and international 
norms.127 Nevertheless, the ICC can still reduce the violence associated 
with rebels.128 
D.  Conflict Termination (Professor Dancy et al.) 
In recent years, Professor Dancy has written a series of articles ex-
ploring the effect of international criminal trials, both on his own and 
with other collaborators. In a 2017 article, he explored the deterrent ef-
fect of the ICC.129 He made a number of findings. First, states that rati-
fied the Rome Statute during the course of a conflict were more likely to 
end that conflict through negotiations than other states.130 Second, con-
flicts in which the ICC intervened were shorter than conflicts in which 
 
ciation has a p value of less than 0.05, then the association is described as statistically significant.  
A p value of less than 0.05 indicates that there is less than a 5% chance that the association is the 
result of random chance (i.e., it represents a greater than 95% chance that the association between 
the explanatory and outcome variable is real). 
 122. Id.  The variable for ICC actions is statistically significant in both Model 2 and 4. 
 123. Id. at 468 (“Rebels do not respond to legal change alone; they are much more impressed 
with action.”). 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
 125. Jo & Simmons, supra note 66, at 468 (noting that their data showed that ICC action 
would deter 17 out of every 100 rebel-sponsored civilian deaths). 
 126. Id. at 467-68. 
 127. Id. at 466. 
 128. Id. at 470 (“Rebels are harder to deter than governments.  Nonetheless, even rebels ap-
pear to significantly reduce intentional civilian killing when the ICC has signaled its determina-
tion to prosecute.”). 
 129. See Geoff Dancy, Searching for Deterrence at the International Criminal Court, 17 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 625 (2017). 
 130. Id. at 638; see also Dancy and Montal, supra note 73, at 662. 
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the ICC did not intervene (2.05 years versus 3.41 years).131 The latter 
finding, although intriguing, was not statistically significant.132 He con-
cluded that this was “suggestive evidence” that joining the ICC encour-
aged parties to reach negotiated settlements of conflicts.133 At the same 
time, Professor Dancy acknowledged that the presence of the ICC was 
just one factor that could result in conflict termination, so it was not 
possible to draw firm conclusions from his results.134 
He also looked at one-sided violence against civilians in countries 
that were the subject of ICC investigations.135 He found that violence 
decreased after ICC intervention in four of those situations (the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Uganda, and Libya), while vio-
lence increased in only two of them (the Central African Republic and 
Nigeria).136 In three cases (Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali), there was 
no trend in the violence after the ICC intervened.137 He viewed these 
finding as warranting “cautious optimism” that the ICC could deter vio-
lence because violence decreased after ICC intervention more often than 
it increased.138  
Finally, he looked at the rate at which new conflicts began in ICC 
members states versus non-members.139 The results showed that ICC 
members states were significantly less likely to become involved in new 
conflicts than non-members.140 Ultimately, he concluded that there was 
no evidence that the ICC obstructed peace or prolonged conflicts and 
that there was some evidence that it shortened conflicts and reduced 
violence.141 
 
 131. See Dancy, supra note 129, at 643. 
 132. Id.  Professor Dancy reported a p-value of .263.  Id. at fn. 76.  This is roughly equivalent 
to a 1 in 4 chance that the result is simply random chance.  Of course, that also means there is a 
roughly 3 in 4 chance it is a real result.  As more data become available it will probably be possi-
ble to clarify this finding. 
 133. Id. at 638. 
 134. Id. at 643 (“While the record indicates that violent rebel groups are generally active for 
less time following ICC intervention than they are in other cases, it could be that too many other 
factors contribute to conflict termination – so many that ICC involvement does not have a gener-
alizable effect.”). 
 135. Id. at 647. 
 136. Id. at 648. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 651-652. 
 140. Id. at 652; see also Dancy and Montal, supra note 73, at 677. 
 141. See Dancy, supra note 129, at 654 (“[T]his is a substantial finding because the Court 
does not have an overall negative effect.  Though the ICC has received a good deal of criticism 
for its involvement in conflict zones, if anything, its effect is on average slightly positive.”). 
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In a 2018 article, Professor Dancy and Professor Wiebelhaus-
Brahm explored the impact of criminal prosecutions during civil wars 
on conflicts.142 Although their study included an analysis of the effect of 
domestic trials, this discussion will focus on their analysis of interna-
tional trials. In their model, they assessed the impact of international 
criminal trials on conflict termination.143 After controlling for a number 
of factors thought to influence conflict termination,144 they found that 
international trials were associated with conflict termination.145 Accord-
ing to their model, the existence of an international trial was associated 
with a 9-10% increase in the probability that the conflict would end,146 
although the result was not statistically significant.147 Ultimately, they 
concluded that, while their study did not provide statistically significant 
evidence that international trials were associated with ending conflicts, 
it did largely dispel concerns that ICC involvement prolongs conflicts.148 
E. Reducing Human Rights Violations (Professor Appel) 
In a 2018 article, Professor Appel explored whether states that rati-
fy the Rome Statute engage in more or less human rights violations than 
non-ratifiers.149 His model controlled for a number of variables that are 
known to be associated with respect for human rights, including popula-
tion size, per capita gross domestic product, democracy, regime type, an 
independent judiciary, and any recent history of conflict.150 Moreover, 
the statistical technique he used was specifically chosen to minimize the 
possibility that the ICC would appear to be associated with lower rates 
of human rights violations because only states with good human rights 
records join the ICC.151  
The results showed that ratifiers of the Rome Statute did have few-
er human rights violations than non-ratifiers and that this result was sta-
 
 142. See Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 79. 
 143. Id. at 50 (defining international trials to be trials conducted by international judicial in-
stitutions, “including ad hoc international tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); hybrid international-domestic tribunals like the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone; and the ICC”). 
 144. Id. at 54 (describing the control variables). 
 145. Id. at 56. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 56-57; see also Dancy and Montal, supra note 73, at 670 (finding no statistically 
significant relationship between ICC involvement and conflict termination). 
 148. See Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 79, at 58-59. 
 149. See Appel, supra note 72. 
 150. Id. at 13-14 (discussing the control variables). 
 151. Id. at 14-17 (discussing the problem of endogeneity and why the difference in difference 
(DiD) technique was chosen to minimize endogeneity). 
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tistically significant.152 Since the human rights variable in the model is 
based on the frequency of acts of torture, summary execution, physical 
disappearances, and political imprisonment,153 this means a reduction in 
human rights violations means a reduction in violence. The effect size 
of the reduction (i.e., its impact on human rights violations) was similar 
to the impact of having an independent judiciary, which was also found 
to reduce human rights violations.154  
While ratifiers did, on average, have better human rights records 
than non-ratifiers, the human rights records of ratifiers continued to im-
prove after ratification and improved more than the human rights rec-
ords of non-ratifiers.155 These results led him to conclude that states’ 
human rights practices improve after joining the ICC.156 Or to put it an-
other way, his study represents “systematic evidence that the Court can 
deter leaders from committing atrocities.”157 
V.   SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
While many scholars have very strong opinions about whether the 
ICC can prevent violence, it is only in the last few years that we have 
seen meaningful attempts to test that question empirically.158 The re-
search discussed above represents an important new chapter in research 
about the ICC. For the first time, we can really answer the question of 
whether the ICC can prevent violations of ICL. 
All the articles described above come with some caveats. Professor 
Hillebrecht notes that studying Libya represents a best case for the in-
fluence of the ICC.159 However, she also controlled for a number of var-
iables other than ICC intervention that could have affected the civilian 
death rate in Libya.160 Professor Meernik notes that we don’t know ex-
actly why some states respect human rights and thus improved human 
rights might be the result of something other than the ICC,161 but he also 
controlled for a number of variables that we might expect to influence 
compliance with human rights obligations.162 Professors Jo and Sim-
 
 152. Id. at 18. 
 153. Id. at 4. 
 154. Id. at Fig. 1. 
 155. Id. at 20. 
 156. Id. at 19-20. 
 157. Id. at 22. 
 158. Id. at 449. 
 159. Hillebrecht, supra note 76, at 617. 
 160. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 161. Meernik, supra note 77, at 333. 
 162. Id. 
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mons also express some concern about the influence of unobserved var-
iables.163 But, they too used control variables to isolate the effect of the 
ICC from the effect of other variables one would expect to influence vi-
olence.164 Professor Dancy acknowledged that it is hard to isolate the 
ICC’s effect on conflict termination.165 Professor Appel was concerned 
that the ICC might appear to reduce violations of human rights if only 
states that had good human rights records joined the Rome Statute,166 
but he chose a statistical test designed to minimize that possibility and 
used a number of control variables to try and isolate the effect of the 
ICC.167  
Ultimately, there will always be caveats associated with statistical 
studies – there is always the possibility that the model is effected by 
variables you have not accounted for.168 Nonetheless, the authors took 
pains to control for the variables (other than the ICC) that were most 
likely to explain the results. By controlling for such variables, they 
sought to disentangle the impact of the ICC from the impact of other 
variables that might affect the results. These efforts help ensure the re-
sults are robust. 
With the exception of Professor Dancy’s work,169 these studies, 
each using a different data set and a different methodology, inde-
pendently came to essentially the same conclusion – the ICC does pre-
vent violence. Professor Hillebrecht found that the ICC’s intervention in 
Libya reduced civilian casualties.170 Professor Meernik found that states 
with a strong commitment to the ICC had fewer human rights violations 
 
 163. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 66, at 464 (noting that the effects of ratification of the 
Rome Statute could be attributable to an unobserved variable like political liberalization). 
 164. Id. at 465 (“The evidence of the ICC’s ability to deter is based on rigorous controls for 
many underlying conditions that could plausibly contribute both to ratification and reduced gov-
ernment-killing, such as changing regime type, quality of the rule of law, government-rebel reci-
procity regarding civilians, even changing experiences and preferences with respect to peace and 
justice.”). 
 165. See supra text accompanying note 134. 
 166. See Appel, supra note 72, at 14-17. 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 150-151. 
 168. This is known as omitted variable bias.  See Omitted Variable Bias, 
https://www.econometrics-with-r.org/6-1-omitted-variable-bias.html. The typical way to reduce 
the impact of this problem is to include as control variables all the variables that are known or 
expected to affect the dependent variable.  This is not always a perfect solution as it is possible 
that there are variables that affect the dependent variable that are unknown and thus cannot be 
included as controls.  But see Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in 
Econometric Research, 22 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE 341 (2005) (arguing 
that control variables do not always reduce the effect of omitted variable bias). 
 169. Professor Dancy has studied a different phenomenon from the other authors cited in this 
article and his work is treated separately below.  See infra text accompanying notes 177-186. 
 170. See Hillebrecht, supra note 76, at 637. 
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than other states, independent of their overall commitment to the rule of 
law.171 Professors Jo and Simmons found that the ICC reduced civilian 
deaths caused by both the government and rebel groups, though the ef-
fect was more dramatic for government forces.172 Professor Appel found 
that joining the ICC was associated with a reduction in serious human 
rights abuses.173 
We can now say with reasonable confidence that the ICC does 
prevent violence. Ratification of the Rome Statute is associated with a 
reduction in violence. Criminalizing violations of international criminal 
law in domestic law is associated with a reduction in violence. And 
when the ICC acts, whether to open an investigation, issue an arrest 
warrant, or try an accused person, there is a reduction in violence. 
Moreover, these effects appear to be additive.174 There are no empirical 
studies showing that it increases violence.175  
While a single article might not settle the question, a whole series 
of articles using different datasets and different methodologies that all 
come to the same conclusion is much more persuasive. In short, when 
considered together, the available empirical studies strongly suggest that 
the ICC does prevent violence. Considering how “highly contested” this 
question has been amongst scholars,176 the uniformity of the empirical 
results is particularly striking. 
Professor Dancy et al.’s work is different from the other empirical 
studies discussed in this Article and is treated separately here. The most 
important difference is that he and his co-authors studied a different 
phenomenon. Rather than studying violence reduction, their articles 
dealt with conflict termination.177 As Dancy and Montal have noted, 
ending an existing conflict is significantly harder than reducing the 
amount of violence within an ongoing conflict.178 Indeed, none of the 
 
 171. Meernik, supra note 77, at 336. 
 172. Jo & Simmons, supra note 66, at 469-70. 
 173. See supra Part IV(E). 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 92.  This is also implicit in the results of Model 4 in 
Professors Jo and Simmons’ work.  See Jo & Simmons, supra note 66, at Table 2.  In Model 4, 
Rome Statute ratification, domestic criminalization of violations of international criminal law, 
and ICC action are all tested simultaneously.  And each of them has a separate and statistically 
significant effect in reducing violence. 
 175. See Dancy and Montal, supra note 73, at 675 (“However, the fact remains that [the] only 
evidence on the systematic murder of civilians . . . shows that ICC ratifiers are more respectful of 
civilians.  No evidence to the contrary has been published.”). 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
 177. See supra Part IV(D). 
 178. See Dancy and Montal, supra note 3, at 659 (recognizing that ending a conflict after it 
has started is a difficult and perhaps unfair thing to expect the ICC to accomplish); see also Dan-
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violence prevention articles discussed above found that the ICC reduced 
the level of violence to zero.179  
The difficulty of stopping or preventing conflicts may explain why 
many of Professor Dancy et al.’s tests did not reach statistical signifi-
cance. Thus, while their models suggest that conflicts involving ICC 
members are shorter,180 that conflicts are more likely to end when inter-
national trials occurred,181 and that ICC members are less likely to be-
come involved in conflicts than non-members,182 the results generally 
did not reach the level of statistical significance.183 
As a result of this limitation, Professor Dancy’s conclusions are 
more measured than the other authors. He does not claim that the ICC 
ends conflicts. Rather, his work provides only “suggestive evidence” 
that the ICC may be able to end some ongoing conflicts and prevent 
some new ones.184 It could be that with more and better data, it would be 
possible to draw more definitive conclusions.185 But, at the least, his 
work largely rules out the possibility that the ICC exacerbates existing 
conflicts or makes new conflicts more likely.186 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a question: Can the ICC succeed? Answer-
ing that question requires that we first know what the ICC is supposed 
to accomplish. After all, it can only be called a success if it accomplish-
es its goals.187 A number of goals have been ascribed to the ICC in the 
scholarly literature. But not all these goals are equal. Rather, there is a 
hierarchy amongst them, and the court should be judged by whether it 
accomplishes those goals that have the highest expected value.188  
 
cy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 79, at 49 (noting the important difference between reduc-
ing violence within a conflict and stopping the conflict). 
 179. For example, Professors Jo and Simmons found that the ICC could reduce government-
sponsored killings by about 50% and rebel-sponsored killings by about 20%.  See supra Part 
IV(C). 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 130-132. 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 143-147. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 139-141. 
 183. See supra Part IV(D). 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
 185. If there was a small but positive effect of ICC involvement on conflict termination, then 
it may be possible to detect that effect with a larger pool of data.  Of course, if there really is no 
effect, then more data would demonstrate that as well. 
 186. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
 187. Shany, supra note 24, at 230. 
 188. A Hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts, supra note 26, at 192. 
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The goal with the highest expected value is the prevention of vio-
lations of international criminal law.189 This is because serious viola-
tions of ICL have enormous costs for the victims of those crimes, as 
well as their friends, families, neighbors, and colleagues.190 Violations 
also have enormous societal costs ranging from the tens of billions to 
hundreds of billions of dollars per conflict.191 Thus, preventing those vi-
olations has enormous value. Or, as Benjamin Franklin once said, “an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”192 
This means that if the ICC can prevent violations of international 
criminal law, then it is accomplishing its most important goal. Despite 
many scholars having vehemently argued that the ICC cannot prevent 
violence, until recently there had been little empirical evidence one way 
or the other.193 That is no longer the case. Thanks to recent articles by 
Professors Hillebrecht, Meernik, Appel, Jo and Simmons, there is now 
strong evidence that the ICC does prevent violence.194 There is also 
some evidence that the ICC can shorten ongoing conflicts and prevent 
some conflicts from occurring.195 
Can the ICC succeed? The ICC’s principal goal is to prevent viola-
tions of international criminal law and it is already doing that. There-
fore, the ICC is already succeeding. But this is not the dominant narra-
tive about the Court. Recently, the Court has been dogged by a number 
of high-profile problems, and scholarship about the court has become 
increasingly critical.196 There is a sense among many international crim-
inal law scholars that the court is in crisis.197 Nevertheless, the evidence 
strongly suggests that the ICC is already accomplishing its most im-
portant goal. Particularly given how “contested” claims of violence pre-
vention by international criminal courts have been,198 this is an extreme-
ly important finding; one that more scholars and policymakers need to 
be aware of. 
Of course, this does not mean that the ICC is perfect. There are 
still problems and the ICC might ultimately fail. The acquittal of Lau-
 
 189. Id. at 181. 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
 192. See Daniel Kiel, An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Reframing the De-
bate About Law School Affirmative Action, 88 DENVER U. L. REV. 791, 791 n.3 (2010) (attrib-
uting the saying “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” to Benjamin Franklin). 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52. 
 194. See supra Part IV(F). 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 177-186. 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 3-9. 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
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rent Gbagbo, the collapse of the Kenyatta trial, and the suspension of 
the investigation in Darfur really were setbacks for the Court.199 And the 
concerns of African states cannot be solved by pointing out that the ICC 
does prevent violence.200 But, despite the problems and criticisms,201 we 
should not lose sight of the fact that the ICC was set up, in large part, to 
prevent violations of international criminal law202 and it is already doing 
that.203 Thus, by one very important measure it is already succeeding. 
It is also important to note that this is a claim about the present. 
The evidence discussed in this Article does not show that the ICC might 
be able, in some vague and distant future, to prevent violence. The evi-
dence convincingly shows that the ICC is already preventing violence 
all over the world. There are people alive today who would not be alive 
if the Court did not exist. 
The recent wave of empirical studies of the ICC’s effect on vio-
lence are a very important step in the study of the Court, but there are 
still many unanswered questions. One obvious avenue for future empir-
ical research is to try and identify which ICC actions do the most to re-
duce or prevent violations of international criminal law. If we could 
identify the mechanisms by which the ICC reduces violence, then it 
could concentrate on those actions that are most likely to prevent vio-
lence. Thus, further empirical study might permit the ICC to maximize 
its preventive effect. 
 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7. 
 201. For example, Dancy and Montal acknowledge that the ICC “has a difficult time building 
and completing cases, and it faces the same obstacles as other multilateral institutions that inter-
vene in conflict states.” Nevertheless, they argued that the results of the recent spate of empirical 
research was grounds for “cautious optimism” about the Court’s ability to prevent violence; see 
Dancy and Montal, supra note 73, at 681. 
 202. Prevention was clearly a goal of the ICC from its founding. The Preamble to the Rome 
Statue recognizes that “millions of children, women, and men have been victims of unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity” and then goes on to claim that prosecut-
ing those responsible for these atrocities will “contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” Rome 
Statute, Preamble. 
 203. See supra Part IV. 
